Serbia

Electoral competition in Serbia is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the real, mainstream opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), in power since 2012, enjoys significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermine the opposition’s ability to compete, including significant overrepresentation in the media and abuse of public resources. The opposition’s discontent with its inability to compete equitably under such circumstances culminated in a boycott of the 2020 parliamentary elections. Following the parliamentary election in December 2023, marred by allegations of fraud and assessed by international observers as “dominated” by the SNS due to “systemic advantages”, the mainstream opposition organized mass protests and called for a rerun with enhanced oversight.

Independent media and organizations are seriously and unfairly hindered in their capacity to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Independent media outlets that challenge the SNS’s policies face obstruction by the powerful Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM), whose executive Council consists almost exclusively of pro-regime officials directly appointed by a parliamentary majority. Gratuitous legal persecution initiated by members of Parliament and other elites and frequent intimidation campaigns by non-state actors plausibly affiliated with the regime also pose significant threats to independent journalism. While the regime has refrained from shutting down major dissenting organizations, new “anti-terror” legislation, introduced in 2020, imposed arbitrarily strict reporting requirements for NGOs that receive foreign funding and introduced hefty penalties for non-compliance. Civil society leaders are also frequently subjected to verbal harassment by regime officials and smear campaigns in pro-regime media. Members of the general public can generally dissent freely, as demonstrated by large pro-democracy demonstrations in recent years. Nonetheless, law enforcement used excessive force against protesters on several notable occasions in the fall of 2025, prompting international criticism.

Serbian institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. While the ruling party has adopted certain internationally endorsed practices that strengthen judicial independence, it has also weakened the independence and operational capacity of the specialized prosecution, responsible for politically sensitive cases. Similarly, the courts have played a dual role, at times enabling and at other times constraining regime officials’ infringements on freedom of dissent. Finally, the capture of key oversight institutions has further insulated party officials from accountability for electoral violations, the misuse of public funds, and other abuses of power. This pattern, in which institutions are neither fully independent nor thoroughly hollowed out, is a salient characteristic of Serbia’s regime.