10,000,000 people
Source: Tyranny Tracker
In late 2025, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) completed a full administrative and territorial takeover of Southern Yemen – effectively ending the IRG’s administrative presence in Yemen’s southern governorates. Given the recency of this shift, the methodological implications of the STC’s move have not yet been fully analyzed or integrated into current formal reporting. This summary should be viewed as an assessment of the IRG’s status up until this volatile transition period.
HRF classifies Yemen – PLC-controlled territory as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
Since the Arab Spring in 2011, Yemen has been embroiled in a prolonged and complex conflict that began with a popular uprising against long-standing authoritarian president Ali Abdullah Saleh. By early 2012, the conflict led to Saleh’s abdication and the subsequent transfer of power to his vice president, Abdrabbu Mansur Hadi. Hadi’s Internationally Recognized Government (IRG), made up largely of Sunnis, continued to receive backing from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, the IRG appeared to exclude the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, a Zaidi Shia Muslim separatist group originating from Saada in northern Yemen that remained critical of the IRG. The conflict intensified in 2014, driven by political grievances between the IRG, based in Aden, and the Houthi movement, based in Sanaa. The Houthis, who had a history of clashing with Yemeni authorities dating back to the early 2000s, sought to expand their control and overthrow the IRG. The conflict has had devastating human costs: the United Nations estimates that 233,000 people have died since 2014, including deaths directly caused by violence and indirectly by famine, disease, and the collapse of healthcare services. In March 2022, the Saudi-led GCC coalition forced Hadi to transfer authority to an unelected GCC-appointed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) led by Rashad al-Alimi. This move aimed to unite various anti-Houthi factions and strengthen their opposition to the Houthi insurgency. However, efforts to broker peace through a subsequent UN-mediated truce beginning in April 2022 failed to produce a lasting peace, leaving the country in a fragile state of suspended conflict. By December 2025, Yemen’s territorial divide grew more pronounced following a significant expansion by the Southern Transitional Council (STC) across the southern governorates. While the Houthis remained entrenched in Sanaa and the northern highlands, the STC moved to consolidate its grip on Aden and the southern coast, effectively challenging the IRG/PLC’s grip on power. Meanwhile, the persistent presence of groups like ISIS and AQAP in isolated pockets continues to complicate the security environment, leaving Yemen with an increasingly fractured and multi-polar political landscape.
National-level elections are absent in areas under IRG/PLC control, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. With the exception of a national referendum that saw Hadi run unopposed in 2012, presidential and legislative elections have been delayed by repeated cycles of conflict and violence and a lack of regular political activity. The PLC has faced significant challenges and criticisms, including internal fragmentation and rivalries among its members, who often command their own organized armed groups (OAGs) with differing agendas. This has led to a lack of a cohesive political strategy, undermining the council’s ability to govern effectively or facilitate elections. The council’s ability to assert its authority has also been questioned, as some of its members, particularly from the STC, control more powerful forces than the IRG/PLC chairman.
Independent media, political figures, civil society groups, and ordinary citizens suffer overt and systematic reprisal if they openly criticize or question the IRG/PLC. Independent journalists are at high risk in IRG/PLC-controlled areas. They are subjected to threats, intimidation, and physical attacks. In some cases, authorities have confiscated their equipment and shut down media outlets. The government’s control over state-run media and its restrictions on independent outlets severely limit the public’s access to diverse and critical information.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. The most significant factor undermining the PLC’s effectiveness is the deep-seated rivalry among its members. The council comprises leaders from different political and military groups with competing agendas, such as the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which seeks to secede, and the Islah Party, a political faction. This lack of a common vision prevents the council from functioning as a cohesive governing body.
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