Blog Post
Oct 19, 2026

China Casts a Wide Net for Travelers with New Exit and Entry Regulations

China Casts a Wide Net for Travelers with New Exit and Entry Regulations
China Casts a Wide Net for Travelers with New Exit and Entry Regulations
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Travelers to China be warned: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) just doubled down on regulations that could subject innocent travelers and citizens to exit bans or detention. China’s new entry and exit regulations expand immigration officials’ power to halt travelers and allow the state to impose exit bans for broadly defined “national security” concerns. Of course, these regulations are not the first to permit exit bans. Rather, they formalize and complement a sprawling web of legislation in China that permits the CCP to restrict the movement of citizens and visitors alike on the basis of vague political or national security interests.

For an in-depth analysis of China’s national security legal framework and its new entry and exit regulations, read HRF’s report, “Risks Beyond Wrongdoing: Traveling to China.”

Because Chinese laws such as the Criminal Code, the Counter-Espionage Law, the Law on the Protection of State Secrets, and the Ethnic Unity and Progress Law provide only vague definitions of terms like “espionage” or “state security,” CCP officials have wide discretion in categorizing innocent behaviors as criminal or otherwise banning them. Take, for example, the recent detention of American academic Min Zin, who traveled to China “at the invitation of the Chinese government,” according to the US State Department, to attend a conference. Zin’s family stopped hearing from him shortly after he arrived on June 3, and later discovered that he had been detained on vague accusations of engaging in “espionage,” with Chinese officials claiming he posed a “national security” threat. Although Zin has not been formally arrested or charged, the CCP is reportedly holding him in a windowless, constantly lit room and subjecting him to long interrogations. 

Zin’s nightmare is, unfortunately, not unique, and it demonstrates the breadth of China’s national security legislation and the state’s ability to impose arbitrary detentions and exit bans. Born in Burma (also known as Myanmar), Zin studied democratization, civil-military relations, and other issues that may have made him a target of the CCP. Other travelers to China have been subjected to similar treatment. For example, the family of artist Gao Zhen is subject to an exit ban and unable to return to the United States, and American seismologist Dr. Youlin Chen has been in prison since October 2024. 

In all of these cases, the charges against the accused are based on activity that most travelers would consider innocent. Gao Zhen is charged with “slandering heroes and martyrs” for art he created depicting Mao, and Dr. Youlin Chen was charged with “espionage” for allegedly conducting research for the US government.

Travelers should not assume they are safe from the CCP. China’s web of laws can ensnare nearly anyone, and most travelers do not discover they are subject to an exit ban until they arrive at the airport. In a national context that represses ethnic groups and silences dissent, innocent activities like conducting research, working as a journalist, or simply posting to social media could be categorized as criminal. Individuals who have relatives that the CCP deems a threat may be at higher risk, along with those who previously held Chinese citizenship. The CCP does not recognize dual citizenship, so the state could choose to deny consular access or other rights afforded to foreign nationals. 

HRF’s team of researchers has prepared travel recommendations and resources for anyone considering travel to China as the CCP continues its pattern of targeting individuals with exit bans and arbitrary detention.

Prepare ahead of time:

  • Assess your risk profile.* Cross-review travel advisories. Get comprehensive travel insurance.
  • Register with your embassy or your government’s crisis notification service, inform them of the potential risk, and identify any available support. When available, designate a trusted emergency contact. 1
  • Prepare basic paperwork explaining the purpose of the trip, ideally with a home point of contact (and their phone number) who can validate that information, in case local police need third-party confirmation. Keep copies of documents such as your passport and travel itinerary.
  • Typical communication channels (such as Instagram, X, WhatsApp, and Facebook) are all banned in China. Arrange an accessible alternative before traveling, and maintain communication with close contacts outside China throughout your trip.
  • Notify your bank of your travel plans and ensure essential overseas payments (including any potential fines) can continue in the event of an unexpected, prolonged absence. Consider authorizing a trusted person to manage your account to avoid returning to closed bank accounts or damaged credit.
  • If you plan to travel to the Uyghur Region or Tibet, carefully consider your trip and its timing.
  • Identify the closest home-country embassy and consulate general. Keep a copy of their contact information on hand.
  • Expect to have your phone checked at the border. Carefully decide which device to bring—ideally, a clean device or a “burner” phone, especially if you meet the criteria for elevated or acute risk exposure criteria in the framework.
  • Exercise caution around sensitive activities and locations. Prioritize activities permitted by your visa; avoid religious activities (for example, private prayer meetings or Bible study groups), working, or volunteering without first confirming regional requirements.
  • Given the high likelihood of digital monitoring, minimize sensitive information and apps on your devices.
  • Avoid carrying or accessing materials that the Chinese government could interpret as politically or religiously sensitive.

If you are detained, harassed, or barred from leaving:

  • Remain calm. Ask who issued the exit ban, on what grounds, and the status (litigation phase or enforcement phase). If possible, also ask for any available procedures for challenging the exit ban.
  • Identify relevant home authorities, including the embassy, consulate, or hostage support groups that can help with such a case, and inform them of the situation. Provide as many details as possible, including the issuing authority, any case number, court name, or reference information you were given. Inform trusted contacts as well.
  • Keep copies of relevant documents and records, such as the court filing and payment record.
  • Exercise caution when presented with documents you don’t fully understand. If you are asked to sign anything, first urge for a complete translation, clarify what your signature would legally acknowledge, and seek a review by a qualified local lawyer. If assistance is refused, state that you do not understand the document and ask for that objection to be recorded.

Risk Profile Assessment

Baseline Exposure

Profile
A short-term tourist traveling for routine personal purposes, with no sensitive roles, relevant family connections, or engagements in high-risk public advocacy.
Implications for Decision-Making

Risk is Not Zero. A traveler may still need to register their place of residence, provide photographs or biometrics, and undergo inspections and surveillance at any stage of travel (which are mostly required by law and must be complied with).

Elevated Exposure

Profile
Current or former PRC nationals, dual nationals, or individuals with pre-existing legal or political disputes with the CCP.
Implications for Decision-Making

Real Risk. China’s legal system has significant authority if the traveler (or their parents) is a current or former PRC national.

Profile
Journalists, artists, and academics working on “sensitive” topics, such as Uyghur forced labor, Taiwan, and Tibet.
Implications for Decision-Making

Extra Caution. Given the PRC’s strict information control system, a sensitive work topic can easily place a traveler under the national security framework.

Profile

Relatives and associates2 of individuals under the Elevated Exposure and Acute Exposure categories.

Implications for Decision-Making

Extra Caution. A relative may become relevant to the regime to obtain information, exert pressure, or intimidate a target abroad into cooperating or returning. Tactics may include questioning, informant recruitment, travel restrictions, detention, and prosecution.

Acute Exposure

Profile

Ethnic-national diaspora, human rights defenders, ethnic rights activists, democracy advocates, religious activists, and dissidents — especially those holding refugee or asylum seeker status3.

Implications for Decision-Making

Avoid Nonessential Travel. For Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers, Chinese dissidents, and Falun Gong practitioners, the risk is substantially higher, while access to remedies is very limited. Phone check, surveillance, interrogation, and intimidation may be expected; these travelers may also be denied entry and prohibited from re-entering.

Profile
Travelers who are wanted by the CCP and those under formal or informal investigation, especially those holding refugee or asylum seeker status.
Implications for Decision-Making

Avoid Travel. If a person is sought by the PRC or under investigation, the likelihood of prosecution is significantly higher, although in certain circumstances, the traveler may be denied entry at the border.

Profile
Individuals with foreign government, military, intelligence, or law enforcement ties.
Implications for Decision-Making

Extra Caution. Travelers should seek formal consultation from relevant agencies (such as a military unit) for travel and legal advice. The risk arises not from wrongdoing, but from an individual’s perceived value as a source of information or leverage.

These classifications reflect a qualitative assessment of documented patterns of PRC scrutiny, not fixed probabilities or predictions of individual outcomes. The categories overlap, and risk may increase when nationality history, identity, activities, information held, relationships, or prior official interests converge.

1 For US citizens, enrollment in STEP registers the trip with the Department of State and the relevant US embassy or consulate. Additionally, filing Form DS-5505 (Privacy Act Written Consent) can authorize State Department officials to share case information with named individuals (family member, lawyer, or representative). Such authorization may reduce privacy-related delays in case of detention, but does not guarantee notification, consular access, or US government intervention.

2Associates are persons with a substantive connection to an individual who is facing acute exposure, such as co-advocates, lawyers, organizational partners, or close personal contacts who may hold relevant information, provide support, transmit communications, or influence that individual’s conduct. 

3Travel to the country from which a person has sought protection could affect a pending asylum claim or prompt a review of recognized refugee status.

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