How the Dictators of Azerbaijan and Turkey Undermine Armenian Democracy

By Tigran Sargsyan

In November 2024, Azerbaijan will host the 29th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), one of the largest conferences in the world dedicated to fighting climate change. The conference will involve 70,000 foreign guests, including the world’s highest-ranking political leaders. Baku’s candidacy was decided a year prior in Dubai during the COP28. To the surprise of many, during the vote for the next host, Armenia suddenly withdrew its candidacy and backed Azerbaijan, with which it was involved in armed hostilities.

This development, however, is not surprising when looking beneath the surface. In the last several years, the two countries were involved in a behind-the-scenes power struggle in which Baku used its successes on the battlefield as a lever to subjugate and undermine Armenia’s democratic system and aspirations.

The two countries experienced hostilities for decades. In the 1990s, following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Baku and Yerevan were involved in several violent clashes, resulting in civilian casualties and destruction. The largest armed conflicts were the First (1988-1994) and Second (2020) Karabakh Wars. During the First Karabakh War, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh managed to defend their de facto independence and proclaim the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The flight of the population and pogroms in Baku and Sumgait overshadowed the conflict.

In 2020, the two countries went into a war again. This time, however, the advantage was on the Azerbaijani side. Backed by Turkey and with modern technologies, Baku was able to quickly overrun Armenia on the battlefield and inflict mass casualties. Russia, which was supposed to protect Armenia, looked on. The war was short-lived. In just 44 days, Armenia lost control of the southern part of Nagorno-Karabakh and lost almost 15 thousand military personnel killed, wounded, and missing in action. Yerevan agreed to withdraw the Armenian troops from the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

Territorial Claims of the Aliyev Regime

One condition of this 2020 ceasefire was the exchange of prisoners of war, or POWs. However, Azerbaijan did not exchange all Armenian POWs and instead used them as bargaining chips by holding them hostage. The withdrawal of Armenia’s candidacy to host COP29 and support of Azerbaijan’s candidacy was the price Armenia paid for the return of Armenian POWs.

The other condition of the ceasefire was the establishment of transport links between the western regions of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, an exclave of Azerbaijan. The document underpinning this agreement was vaguely worded, leaving much room for interpretation. It allowed Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev to claim the road’s extraterritorial status.

Azerbaijan’s state propaganda machine quickly chimed in: It formed a narrative about the “Zangezur Сorridor,” claiming it should belong to Baku. In just a few months, the regime began to argue that the entire Syunik region of Armenia belonged to Azerbaijan. State media called the territory of the Republic of Armenia “Western Azerbaijan” — not to be confused with the Iranian province of the same name. Similarly, regime-sponsored propaganda began to call the Azerbaijani community that left Armenia in the early 1990s the “Western Azerbaijan community.”

The narrative continued to spread through different means. The regime started strategically utilizing sporting events like the “Western Azerbaijan Cup.” In 2024, a website called “Virtual Western Azerbaijan” was launched, dedicated to the history of the Azerbaijani diaspora of Armenia but never mentioning Armenia or Armenians. Inspired by Aliyev’s “Concept of Return,” Azerbaijani irredentism involves renaming Armenian locations. For example, Yerevan is called “Iravan,” and Lake Sevan is called “Goycha.” Additionally, several self-proclaimed organizations emerged in Azerbaijan, claiming parts of Armenia or the entire territory. Among them are the Goycha-Zangazur Republic and the Western Azerbaijan Community.

While Azerbaijani propaganda makes bold claims and preparations for potential territorial gains, Armenia awaits the development of negotiations on a peace treaty and the establishment of friendly relations.

Aliyev and Erdogan’s Interference in Armenia’s Internal Affairs

The Aliyev regime has also exerted pressure on Armenia’s leadership. Similar to Russia’s demands to change the Ukrainian constitution, Azerbaijan demands Armenia amend its constitution as a prerequisite to peace. The preamble to Armenia’s constitution — the Declaration of Independence — is based on the Joint Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh, dated Dec. 1, 1989. It mentions Nagorno-Karabakh and the self-determination of the Armenian population in the region. In 2024, Aliyev said that Baku couldn’t sign a peace treaty before Armenia removed mention of the population’s right to self-determination in the constitution. Moreover, without a peace treaty, Baku would not recognize Armenia’s territorial integrity.

Turkey also demanded Armenia change its coat of arms, alter the school history curriculum, and revise the issue of the Armenian Genocide. Armenia’s coat of arms features Mount Ararat, a national symbol of the Armenian people. However, after World War I and the Armenian-Turkish War, the borders of Turkey and Armenia were drawn so that Mount Ararat ended up in the territory of the Turkish Republic. Despite this, the mountain remained Armenia’s enduring national symbol.

Regarding the school curriculum, Erdogan and Aliyev wish the school subject “History of the Armenian People” — which focuses on history dating back to ancient times — not to cover the Armenian kingdoms, founded in the 9th century BC, which included territories that now belong to Turkey. Historical Armenia and the geographical Armenian Highland stretched across eastern Turkey, naturally irritating the Turkish government. In January 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attempted to accommodate the request by proposing a revised subject, “History of the Republic of Armenia.” The initiative was met with sharp criticism in Armenia and viewed as an attempt to abandon centuries-old Armenian heritage, confining it to the 30-year history of Armenia’s independence.

But perhaps the most sensitive issue for all Armenians is Turkey’s refusal to recognize the 1915 Armenian Genocide, a massacre of 1.5 million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. This is especially sensitive for members of the diaspora, the vast majority of which are survivors of the genocide. The children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren of genocide survivors were bewildered as Pashinyan avoided the word “genocide” in his speech on the genocide victims’ remembrance day. The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention condemns Pashinyan’s “cryptic engagement with genocide denial.” Recognition of the genocide is a cornerstone of Armenian identity. The memory of the massacre unites the Armenian population and the global diaspora in the struggle for recognition and historical justice.

Pashinyan’s Zugzwang: A New War or Weakening Democracy

Why is Pashinyan yielding to Aliyev and Erdogan? As an elected leader of a democratic state, Pashinyan understands that Armenia is in a weak position. Its alleged ally, Russia, is focused on the war in Ukraine and backed away from its commitments to defend its fellow member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization — Moscow’s version of NATO. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has new equipment from Turkey and a leader who doesn’t need to answer to his people. Thus, Armenia tries to avoid confrontation and war at any cost.

Сonstant concessions and compromises, however, only allow Aliyev and Erdogan to increase their threats. These concessions also cause dissatisfaction among Armenian society. In May 2024, Pashinyan announced a demarcation deal with Azerbaijan, which requires Armenia to hand over control of several roads and villages in the Tavush region. The deal led to massive outrage in Armenia, with thousands taking to the streets of Yerevan, calling for Pashinyan’s resignation. The riot police used excessive force to disperse the demonstrations. Pashinyan claims that by making concessions, he is trying to preserve fragile peace; otherwise, Armenia will face war.

Pashinyan’s posture undermines the trust of the Armenian people in their leadership. The country is now yielding to Azerbaijan out of fear of military aggression while also compromising its democratic and domestic principles. In such a power crisis, there is fear that pro-Putin forces may usurp power and bring an end to democracy in Armenia. Perhaps this is precisely Azerbaijan’s goal: to destroy democracy in a neighboring state and place autocrats in power.

In one way or another, Aliyev will achieve his goals. It is unclear, however, at what stage he will stop. He gained control over Nagorno-Karabakh through military aggression and has carried out ethnic cleansing of the region. Now, he aims to weaken Armenia’s democracy and impose his will on Yerevan. Peace and prosperity in the South Caucasus cannot be achieved through Armenian concessions to a dictatorial regime but through the democratization of Azerbaijan.

Tigran Sargsyan is a legal and policy intern at the Human Rights Foundation.