HRF’s Tyranny Tracker classifies China as a fully authoritarian regime, with its immigration, public security, state security, and judicial authorities operating within the same system, led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Formal procedures exist, but their application — particularly in politically sensitive or national security matters — is not subject to the independent scrutiny that travelers might expect in democratic jurisdictions. China has long used entry refusals, visa denials, and exit bans — especially with foreign nationals — without a fair and transparent process. All countries exercise control over entry and exit, but in China, concerns arise over how such control operates within the regime’s national security framework.
China’s “holistic national security” doctrine covers numerous domains — political, economic, cultural, technological, data, cyber, ethnic, religious, and ecological — and the list of domains is described as “dynamically adjustable.” A 2025 white paper issued by the State Council Information Office, “China’s National Security in the New Era,” places “political security” — namely, protecting Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule and the socialist system — at the center and calls for preventing any risks from developing into “political risks.” The PRC’s National Security Law2 further establishes an overarching definition of the term “national security” as prioritizing the CCP’s safety, ruling status, and governing power. For travelers, this creates a pathway by which otherwise ordinary activities, information, or relationships could be classified as security matters because of their perceived political implications.
Overlapping Legal Routes to Bar Entry and Exit
In China, multiple legal mechanisms operate in parallel and overlapping ways, granting various government institutions the power to refuse entry or exit, administer criminal investigations or detentions, and impose consequences on local contacts with little to no meaningful judicial review or constraint.
Even before the 2026 entry-exit regulations, the 2012 Exit and Entry Administration Law already prohibited foreign nationals from leaving China for being a criminal suspect, involved in unsettled civil cases, or “any other circumstances provided by law or administrative regulation” (Article 28). This is supported by Article 262 of the PRC Civil Procedure Law, which allows courts to restrict the departure of persons who fail to perform obligations established by an enforceable legal instrument.
The PRC’s Counter-espionage Law can separately authorize measures that grant security organs investigative and administrative powers. Articles 25 and 36 authorize inspection and seizure of electronic devices, allowing “immediate” content deletion and service suspension; Article 27 allows state security organs to issue oral compulsory summons for questioning; Article 33 expressly permits an exit restriction on someone suspected of espionage. In a complementary vein, Articles 51 and 62 of the PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets states that a person may be investigated for criminal liability for spying or illegally disclosing “state secrets.” However, neither law clearly defines the scope of “espionage” or “state security.”
Then comes the PRC Criminal Law, which criminalizes anyone who participates in an espionage organization or activities (Article 110) and unlawfully provides state secrets to individuals or institutions outside China (Article 111). Once a suspected crime is formally established, the PRC Criminal Procedure Law authorizes residential or criminal detention, allowing the regime to hold suspects much longer without notifying family members or granting regular access.
In other words, the travel risk lies upon the regime’s broad discretion to classify a traveler’s conduct. And if the conduct is classified under national security, espionage, or counterterrorism narratives, then procedural rights are significantly reduced, detention periods are lengthened, and proceedings remain shrouded in state secrecy.
Another piece of legislation that can heighten risk for travelers is the 2026 Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law, which gives statutory form to a governance framework that prioritizes “national unity.” Article 63 establishes extraterritorial jurisdiction to hold individuals and organizations outside of China legally accountable for actions that “undermine ethnic unity” or “create ethnic division.” Again, the law does not clearly define these terms or offenses, nor does it prescribe a penalty. When read in the context where ethnic national groups are severely prosecuted under the counterterrorism narrative over ethnic, cultural, religious, and political identity, a wide range of overseas advocacy, journalism, research, or diaspora engagement may be rendered unlawful, activating investigative, immigration, or criminal procedures, even for foreign travelers.
Context: Travel Control as a Tool of Ethnic and Political Governance
In the Uyghur Region and Tibet, control over movement is much more severe, isolating communities from overseas networks and restricting foreign access to information. Ordinary religious, cultural, and familial connections overseas can be seen as security indicators under the preventative governance system, and lead to harsh penalties.
- Uyghurs and Tibetans Seeking to Travel Abroad: Uyghurs and Tibetans have long faced systematic, community-wide passport confiscations, with severe restrictions on obtaining or renewing travel documents and traveling abroad. Holding a passport, previous travel history (particularly to countries with religious associations, such as Saudi Arabia and India), or having relatives abroad have been sufficient to trigger extrajudicial detention or formal criminal punishment. In short, Uyghurs and Tibetans are already under de facto exit bans, regardless of the national legal threshold.
- Uyghur and Tibetan Diaspora Seeking to Enter: It is generally difficult for diaspora members to return because of (1) the high risk of facing prosecution upon return and (2) the high risk of being denied at the border. Although more recent reporting indicates that some travel has resumed, there is still extensive evidence of Uyghurs facing arrest, disappearance, surveillance, interrogation, and passport confiscation after they return. Naturalized citizens of overseas Tibetans who are eligible to return visa free have reportedly been held for questioning at Chinese airports, had belongings and devices examined, or have been refused entry after questioning about the Dalai Lama or Tibetan cultural work. Hence, members of Uyghur and Tibetan diaspora are also under a de facto entry ban.
- Foreigners Seeking to Enter Tibet or the Uyghur Region: It remains difficult for foreign nationals to travel to these regions. Tibet has a formal special permit requirement for foreign visitors and generally requires organized travel, while travel to the Uyghur Region is characterized by heightened checkpoints, surveillance, and local access restrictions and closures.
Risk Amplifier: Limited Visibility and Protection
The Chinese government does not publish comprehensive exit ban data. A 2023 Safeguard Defenders report found a steep rise between 2016 and 2020 in court database records containing the Chinese phrase for an exit ban (限制出境), while carefully acknowledging that a text mention is not the same as the number of people restricted, and that sensitive and nonjudicial cases are not captured.
The reported cases suggest a pattern in which affected people receive little notice or effective protection, making it extremely hard to challenge an exit ban. Most foreign nationals only discover they are banned from leaving China when they are physically blocked at the airport, often leaving them with limited financial and legal support while exposing them to enhanced government surveillance.
If the exit ban is tied to national security, it is likely based on multiple legal grounds and treated as a domestic issue, resulting in limited public disclosure or open court proceedings. There is generally no trial by jury; the presiding judge or judges will reach a verdict and then, if the accused is found guilty, issue a sentence. Consular services may be denied or delayed, the home-country government has severely limited and slow channels for effective engagement, and quick releases are unlikely — especially when the traveler holds (or has previously held) PRC-issued travel documents, as China does not recognize dual nationality. The practical question is: Which nationality will the PRC treat the traveler as holding?
Context: How the PRC Determines a Traveler’s Nationality
Article 3 of the Nationality Law of the PRC states that China does not recognize dual nationality. This means that if the PRC considers an individual to be Chinese, it may disregard that person’s other citizenship. This may affect two principal groups: people born abroad to Chinese nationals and former Chinese citizens who later acquired foreign nationality.
Under Article 5, a child born abroad to a Chinese national parent automatically receives Chinese citizenship unless that parent has permanently “settled abroad” and the child acquires foreign citizenship at birth. Consider a child born in the United States to Chinese parents who were studying or working there. The US government may recognize the child as a US citizen from birth, but if the parents were not “settled abroad” per Article 5, China may treat the child as Chinese. The law does not define “settled abroad” with sufficient precision, and its application has varied across administrative and judicial contexts.
Article 9 provides for the automatic loss of Chinese nationality when a Chinese citizen “settles abroad” and acquires foreign citizenship. In practice, however, the regime has refused to recognize some individuals’ foreign naturalization upon entry. In some cases, the PRC may require naturalized adult US citizens to renounce their Chinese citizenship before they enter or leave with a US passport. Failure to complete the process may result in an exit restriction.
Additionally, travelers may face an exit ban not because they are accused of wrongdoing, but because restricting them creates leverage over another person, an investigation, or a foreign government. US government guidance warns that relatives of people under investigation — including minors — may themselves be prevented from leaving. For example, Gao Zhen, a lawful US resident, was detained in China during a holiday trip, and his son, a US citizen, was also unable to leave due to an effective travel ban on Gao’s wife. Therefore, travel risk cannot be assessed solely by examining the traveler’s own conduct. Relatives and close associates of human rights defenders, dissidents, people sought by the Chinese government, or individuals involved in politically sensitive proceedings may have a higher risk exposure than ordinary travelers.
The relational exposure is bidirectional. A traveler may attract scrutiny because of another person, but may also expose local residents or their relatives to risk through any meetings, communications, photographs, or retained records. Given the expansive number of plainclothed police and government officials and the PRC’s intense surveillance system, any contact can be easily identified and subsequently face questioning, coercion, or even detention. A foreign visitor’s successful departure does not, therefore, establish that the interaction caused no harm. This transferred risk is particularly acute in the Uyghur Region and Tibet, because overseas contact may itself be treated as a security indicator.
Drawing on HRF’s experiences supporting frontline activists and its ongoing documentation of the CCP’s abuses, the framework below outlines the relative risk exposures that travelers may face based on their profiles. It aims to serve as a reference for informed decision-making, and is not a substitute for legal advice.
These classifications reflect a qualitative assessment of documented patterns of PRC scrutiny, not fixed probabilities or predictions of individual outcomes. The categories overlap, and risk may increase when nationality history, identity, activities, information held, relationships, or prior official interests converge.
Baseline Exposure
Profile
Implications for Decision-Making
Risk is Not Zero. A traveler may still need to register their place of residence, provide photographs or biometrics, and undergo inspections and surveillance at any stage of travel (which are mostly required by law and must be complied with).
Elevated Exposure
Profile
Implications for Decision-Making
Real Risk. China’s legal system has significant authority if the traveler (or their parents) is a current or former PRC national.
Profile
Implications for Decision-Making
Extra Caution. Given the PRC’s strict information control system, a sensitive work topic can easily place a traveler under the national security framework.
Profile
Implications for Decision-Making
Extra Caution. A relative may become relevant to the regime to obtain information, exert pressure, or intimidate a target abroad into cooperating or returning. Tactics may include questioning, informant recruitment, travel restrictions, detention, and prosecution.
Acute Exposure
Profile
Implications for Decision-Making
Avoid Nonessential Travel. For Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers, Chinese dissidents, and Falun Gong practitioners, the risk is substantially higher, while access to remedies is very limited. Phone check, surveillance, interrogation, and intimidation may be expected; these travelers may also be denied entry and prohibited from re-entering.
Profile
Implications for Decision-Making
Avoid Travel. If a person is sought by the PRC or under investigation, the likelihood of prosecution is significantly higher, although in certain circumstances, the traveler may be denied entry at the border.
Profile
Implications for Decision-Making
Extra Caution. Travelers should seek formal consultation from relevant agencies (such as a military unit) for travel and legal advice. The risk arises not from wrongdoing, but from an individual’s perceived value as a source of information or leverage.
Recommendations
- Assess your risk profile. Cross-review travel advisories. Get comprehensive travel insurance.
- Register with your embassy or your government’s crisis notification service, inform them of the potential risk, and identify any available support. When available, designate a trusted emergency contact6.
- Prepare basic paperwork explaining the purpose of the trip, ideally with a home point of contact (and their phone number) who can validate that information, in case local police need third-party confirmation. Keep copies of documents such as your passport and travel itinerary.
- Typical communication channels (such as Instagram, X, WhatsApp, and Facebook) are all banned in China. Arrange an accessible alternative before traveling, and maintain communication with close contacts outside China throughout your trip.
- Notify your bank of your travel plans and ensure essential overseas payments (including any potential fines) can continue in the event of an unexpected, prolonged absence. Consider authorizing a trusted person to manage your account to avoid returning to closed bank accounts or damaged credit.
- If you plan to travel to the Uyghur Region or Tibet, carefully consider your trip and its timing.
- Identify the closest home-country embassy and consulate general. Keep a copy of their contact information on hand.
- Expect to have your phone checked at the border. Carefully decide which device to bring — ideally, a clean device or a “burner” phone, especially if you meet the criteria for elevated or acute risk exposure criteria in the framework.
Context: Protecting Your Mobile Devices
There is no expectation of privacy on mobile or other networks in the PRC, as internet and mobile service providers are legally required to provide intelligence and security services with on-demand access to data and networks. Adopt enhanced digital security measures before departure and throughout your trip:
- Keep your operating system updated to reduce vulnerabilities that could be exploited for malware or data extraction.
- Avoid plugging your device into USB charging ports in public spaces; if you must use a wall hub, make sure to have a power-only USB-C cable.
- Activate Apple Lockdown Mode or Android Advanced Protection Mode for an extra layer of protection against cyberattacks.
- Avoid linking any Chinese apps to your personal phone number, email address, or ID.
- Do not enter sensitive or personal information into any Chinese AI tools.
For more specific tips on Chinese app security and general digital and physical protection, check out HRF’s toolkit.
- Exercise caution around sensitive activities and locations. Prioritize activities permitted by your visa; avoid religious activities (for example, private prayer meetings or Bible study groups), working, or volunteering without first confirming regional requirements.
- Given the high likelihood of digital monitoring, minimize sensitive information and apps on your devices.
- Avoid carrying or accessing materials that the Chinese government could interpret as politically or religiously sensitive.
If you are detained, harassed, or barred from leaving:
- Remain calm. Ask who issued the exit ban, on what grounds, and the status (litigation phase or enforcement phase). If possible, also ask for any available procedures for challenging the exit ban.
- Identify relevant home authorities, including the embassy, consulate, or hostage support groups that can help with such a case, and inform them of the situation. Provide as many details as possible, including the issuing authority, any case number, court name, or reference information you were given. Inform trusted contacts as well.
- Keep copies of relevant documents and records, such as the court filing and payment record.
- Exercise caution when presented with documents you don’t fully understand. If you are asked to sign anything, first urge for a complete translation, clarify what your signature would legally acknowledge, and seek a review by a qualified local lawyer. If assistance is refused, state that you do not understand the document and ask for that objection to be recorded.
Although the PRC legal system is vague, it does follow established procedures. Diligently follow up with relevant officials on different stages of the process and how to navigate them. Additionally, recognize the possibility that even if a ban is lifted, it could be replaced with a new one.
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The risks in traveling to China are not the product of any single law or regulation. They are the culmination of years of existing practices within an autocratic regime where boundaries, decisions, and judgments are set through rule by law, not rule of law.
Not every visitor will be detained or prevented from leaving. At the same time, no single successful trip is a reliable indicator of future safety; there are documented cases of individuals being detained on subsequent trips. The bottom line is that traveling to China carries real and documented risks, although the risks vary according to each traveler’s profile and circumstances.
HRF’s Chinese Communist Party Disruption Initiative (CCPDI) aims to expose how the CCP threatens human rights and freedoms worldwide. To learn more, visit CCPDI.
A los responsables políticos y a la comunidad internacional
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Abstenerse de realizar visitas oficiales u otro tipo de actividades que puedan contribuir a legitimar al régimen ecuatoguineano, incluidas aquellas enmarcadas en la diplomacia deportiva.
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A la FIFA
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A LaLiga
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A los futbolistas profesionales
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Al régimen de Guinea Ecuatorial
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References
The PRC may issue exit bans on the grounds of criminal investigations, civil disputes, tax and regulation issues, or company-related bans; however, this piece focuses on travel restrictions issued in relation to national security.
China’s Law on the Protection of State Secrets defines “state secrets” as matters that “concerns China’s national security and interests” and are determined according to statutory procedures. It includes state policy decisions and secret matters relating to national defense, armed forces, state security, investigation of crimes, and foreign affairs, as well as matters relating to the national economy, social development, science and technology, with a society-wide obligation to protect.
For example, Taiwan Compatriot Permit (台胞证 taibaozheng), identity cards (身份证 shenfenzheng), or household registration (户口 hukou).
Associates are persons with a substantive connection to an individual who is facing acute exposure, such as co-advocates, lawyers, organizational partners, or close personal contacts who may hold relevant information, provide support, transmit communications, or influence that individual’s conduct.
Travel to the country from which a person has sought protection could affect a pending asylum claim or prompt a review of recognized refugee status.
For US citizens, enrollment in STEP registers the trip with the Department of State and the relevant US embassy or consulate. Additionally, filing Form DS-5505 (Privacy Act Written Consent) can authorize State Department officials to share case information with named individuals (family member, lawyer, or representative). Such authorization may reduce privacy-related delays in case of detention, but does not guarantee notification, consular access, or US government intervention.
